Frederick van der Ploeg IN rnt. rknt~rncrNnt, onc country Mundcll-Flcming worW with (loating rxrhanl;c ratcs and pcrfcct capital mobility a fiscal expansion Icads to an inripicnt ritic in thc intcrest ratc and capital inflows, which are chokcd off by an appreciation of the exchange rate. The contraction in net exports cc~mpletely crowds out the increase in government spending. The Mundellf-lcminl; modcl assumcs fixcd nominal wages and only considcrs aggrcgatc t)cmand. Ilowcvcr, rcal wagc rigidity in aggrcgatc supply rcvcrses thc yualitativc naturc of ihc policy conclusions. A fiscal expansion now Icads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate and a cut in the wedge between thc produccrs' :tnd consumcrs' wage, so that employment and output incrcasc (Cas; ts, 1975; Argy and Salop, 1979; Sachs, 1980; van de Klundcrt and van dcr Plocg, 1989) . In thc two-country Mundell-Flcming world a home fiscal expansion increases the world interest rate, which reduces the demand for money, excrts an upward pressure on the price level, erodes the real value of the wage and thcrcfore increases aggrcgate supply both at home and abroad. T;;c~~-r~o., nf thP hnmP currency and the resulting incrcase in net .,ppr,,....... exports of the forcign country increases the demand for foreign goods, despite thc rise in the interest rate. Because fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy in a Mundell-Fleming world, it can be argued that in the absence of international policy coordination there is a deflationary bias in fiscal policy and thercfore too much unemployment. }{owcver, when both countries have rcal rather than nominal wage rigidity, a fiscal expansion is a bcggar-thy-neighbour policy as the associated appreciation of the real exchange rate incrcases the wedge between the forcign producers' and consumcrs' wage and therefore reduces foreign output and employment (Argy and Salop, 1983; Oudiz and Sachs, 1984; van der Plocg, 1987) . Abscnce of intcrnational policy coordination now implics that both countrics adopt a too loose fiscal stance, because each country ignores the advcrsc cf(ccts of a fiscal expansion on thc othcr country's Icvcls of cmploymcnt and output.
''fhc ;ruthors arc gr,ncful to Gcrard Staarink (ur pcrforming thc computcr simulalions anJ lu 1Villcm Buitcr anJ Alan Kirman fon c~l~ful diccussions. Van dcr Ptocg Ihanks Ihc Gconomic anJ Srxial Rcscarch Cuuncil (U.K.) (or Gnancial suptxxl and workcJ on Ihis papcr during his stay :rt thc Gumtxan Univcrtihy Institutc, Rorcncc, Italy.
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I lowcvcr, lhrre is a reasonable amount of evi~ence that f:urop~has rcal wagc ribi~ity antl that [hc US has numinal wage rigidity (c.g., 13ranson anf tutcmhcrg, Ic)t;0; I3runo and Sachs, Ir)t{5; van dcr Plocg, lyH7). 'Chis may bc bccausc thc Eurupcan countries havc a strong dcgrcc of indcxation of wabcs to cunsumcrs' priccs whcrcas thc US has a significant propurtiun of uvcrlapping norninal wagc contracts. In that casc, a Eurupcan fiscal cxransiun raiscs world intcrest ratcs, rcduccs muncy dcmand in thc US and thus incrcascs priccs in thc US which cuts thc US rcal wagc and boosts cmrluymcnt and output in thc US. liencc, a Europcan fiscal cxpansion is a lucumotivc pulicy. On the othcr hand, a US fiscal cxpansiun is, typically, a bc~,bar-thy-ncighbour policy (also scc Argy and Salop, 19t{3) . "fhis implics that, in thc abscnce of intcrnational policy coordination, thc Europcan fiscal stancc is too tibht from thc US point of vicw and too luosc from thc Europcan point of vicw whilst the US fiscal stancc is, typically, too loosc (van~cr Plocg, 1987) .
Such asymmetries in aggregale supply allow one to undcrstantf why the substancc of the policy dcbatc about thc pcrformancc of thc OECD ecunomics seems to be concerned with the relative tightness of the European fiscal stance and the relative looseness of the US fiscul stance anJ to undcrstantl why recovcry in Europe secros so hard. Howevcr, it is nut clcar that thc ad-huc IS~LM~AS two-country modcls arc wcll suited to ad~ress issucs of international interdependence and policy cuordination. Firstly, a considerable part of the policy debate is about the unsustainability of the trade deficits and government budget deficits of the US and thc possible adverse effects these might have on the European economies. The tax cuts that have been rccently implemented in the US havc resulted in incrcases in the US deticits and government borrowing, which will have to bc paid off by futurc cuts in US govcrnmcnt spcnding and~or futurc incrcascs in US taxcs (including seigniorage revcnucs). ln uthcr words, it is vital in the discussion of international policy interdepcndencc to alluw for the intcrtcmporal budget constraints of governments and private sector agcnts, to allow for current-account dynamics, and to allow for wcaUh effects in aggregate demand. It is also important for these policy discussiuns to alluw government debt to be a part of a private sector wealth. Secondly, acl-hoc modcls go togcther with ad-hoc social wclfarc functions which, typically, dcpcnd on squared dcviations of output and inflatiun (rom thcir dcsircd Icvrls. lt therefore secros desirable to spccify a twu-rountry muclcl with micru founcl:rtions, bccausc thcn a propcr wclfare analysis bascJ un gruss cunsumcrs' surpluscs is fcasible.
Ilcncc, thc ubjcctivc of this papcr is to reconsidcr thc n:rturc of thc shurt-tcrm and lung-tcrm intcrnatiunal spill-ovcr cffccts uf ch:rngcs in govcrnmcnt spcnclinf;, taxation and munctary policy in a two-cuuntry muclcl with mirru fuunclatiuns, intcrtcmporal guvcrnmcnt budgct cunstraints, current-:rccount clynamics, rcal wagc rigidity at homc (Gurupc) antl numinal wabe rigiclity abruad (the US). [n ordcr to rclax thc Ricardian dcht 1!1 VAN DE KLUNDERT AND F. VAN DLR rt.orc; 461 ncutrality pn~husition and to give a non-trivial rolc for tiscal policy, it is atisumrcl that currcnt gcncrations can paSS the burdcn of highcr taxatiun on tci futurr f;rncr:rtions. This happcns whcn thcrc is no intcrgcncrational bcyucst motivc and cithcr livcs arc finitc (Yaari, 19fi5; E3lanrhard, 19H5) ancl~ur thcrc is population growth (Wcll, 19R6 ; I3uitcr, lc)R}i). 'I'his papcr aclupts Ihc firtit pussibility. It extcnds I3uitcr's (I9R7a) two-country mudcl (:1nd thc inlinitc-livcs, two-country modcl of l.ipton and Sachs (19R3)) to allc~w for rcal and nominal wagc rigidity, rathcr than for labour markct clraring in hoth countrics, and to allow for moncy, but it is morc restrictivc as it ahstracts from capital accumulation.
Scctiun 2 formulatcs a two-rountry, pcrfcct-foresight modcl with finite livcs, intcrtcmporal budgct constraints for thc govcrnmcnts and privatc srctor af,cnts, currcnt-account dynamics, uncovcrcd intcrest parity, Iloating cxchangc ratcs, impcrfect substitution betwecn home and forcign goods, intcrnatíonal lahour immobility, rcal wagc rigidity in Europe (homc) and nominal w:rf;c rigidity in the US ( abroad). It leads to cight nonlincar diffcrcntial cquations in tcrms of home and forcign consumplion, homc and forcign rcal moncy balanccs, homc and forcign govcrnmcnt dcbt, nct forcign assets and the forcign nominal wage (normalised by thc foreign nominal mc~ncy supply) and two nonlinear cyuations in terms of the real exchange rate and the rcal interest rate. Section 3 discusses the steady-state properties. In(lation is in the long run a monetary phenomenon and foreign output and employment are at their natural rates. An increase in homc govcrnmcnt spcnding or a cut in taxation leads in the long run to a fall in the world real interest rate, an appreciation of the real exchange rate and an incrcase in homc output and employment. An increase in home monetary grOWlh ha5 n0 rC81 CffCCIJ rii ilie ioïlg run; a S.mply ICaric tn a nne-for-one increasc in thc home inflation rate and the home nominal interest rate. A cut in thc homc rcal wage or an increase in the foreign natural rate of unemployment leads to a depreciation of the real exchange rate and an incrcasc in home output. An increase in foreign government spending or a cut in forcign taxation leads in the long run to a fall in the world real intcrest rate, an appreciation of the foreign real exchange rate and a fall in homc output. Scction 4 discusses various dynamic policy simulations with thc aid of a multiple-shooting algorithm. First, the impact, transicnt and stcady-state spill-over effects of an increase in European government spending are contrasted with the corresponding effects of an increase in US government spending when a tax rule is used to stabilise the government debt in each country. Particular attention is paid to the effects on government borrowing and foreign debt as well as to the real efiects. Second, some aspects of`Reaganomics' are discussed. The main point is th:rt cuts in US taxation gradually Iead to increases in US government dcbt and only then to cuts in US government spending ( cf., F3lanchard, 1987). Thr politiral cconomy of fiscal dcflation for the US is such that a rulc for governmcnt spending to stabilise the govcrnmcnt debt is, perhaps, more an2 FISCAL POLICY AND FINITG LIVLS realistic than a tax rule. 7~hird, the Sargent-Wallace (19ti1) arguments about unplcasant monctaristic arithmctic are rcconsidcrcd. Whcn thcrc is no tax rule or government spending rule to stabilise the government debt and when thcrc is a cciling to the amount of government bonds the privatc scctor is prcparcd to purchase, an cxccss of govcrnmcnt spcnding ovcr taxcs plus scignioragc revenues must eventually be financed by either an incrcase in monctary growth or a structural fiscal adjustmcnt. In thc formcr case, tight moncy today implics high inflation tomorrow and, undcr pcrfect foresight, possibly high inllation today. Also, in the process the government debt has incrcased and therefore one ends up with a permanently higher inflation rate in ordcr to meet the interest payments on the additional governmcnt dcbt (van Wijnbergen, 1985) . !n the latter case, one cnds up with eithcr a permanently lower levcl of government spending or a higher levcl of taxation, which one could refer to as unpleasant fiscal arithmetic. Finally, the implications of supply-side improvements are briefly discussed. Section 5 summarises the results on international policy interdependence and briefly discusscs thc implications for international policy coordination.
A two-counlry model wilh real wage rigidity al home and nominal
wage rigidity abroad
Finite liues and the individua!'s consumption and savings decisioiu
The demand side of each economy is made up of identical consumers with constant life expectancy. There is no intergenerational bequest motive, as in the analysis of E3lanchard (1985) . The (notional) supply of labour at time r of an individual born at time s, t is inelastic and rationed duc to a too high real wage arising from either real or nominal wage rigidity. The consumers born at time s-t have Cobb-Douglas preferences over the consumption at time t of private home goods, cd (s, t) , private foreign goods, cm (s, t) , publicly providcd home goods, G~(t), publicly providcd forcign goods, Gm(r), and real moncy balanccs, m (s, t) . Feenstra (1985) provides a justification, bascd on liquidity costs, for entering moncy in the utility function. Government spending usually gives utilíty, although it may be of thc 'holc-in-thc-ground' varicty. Consumcrs havc an intertcmporal clasticily of substitution of unity, so that the consumer born at time s s t faces thc following problem at time t: Choose c~ (s, t), c,,,(s, t) and m(s, t) for t, s to maximise thc utility (unction,
subjcct to thc individual consumcr's flow budget constraint,
dn(s, t)Idt -(r(t) f~3)n(s. t) f w(t)1(s. t) f~r(s. t) -z(s, t) -c(s, t). (2-2)
'tll VAN DG KLUNDERT AND F. VAN DGR PIAGG 463 ancl thc conclition prccluding Ponzi gamcs,
whcrc tolal consumption is dclined as (2.4) tlrc numin:cl intcresl ratc is defincd as 5) n denotcs the subjectivc rate of time preference,~3 denotes the constant instantaneous probability of death, w
(t), r(t), p(t) -(dP(t)~dt)~P(t), P(t)
and v(t) denotc lhc real wage, the real interest rate, the inflation rate, the price Icvel and thc real exchange rate (the price of foreign goods in terms of home goods) at time t, respectively, and !(s, t), n(s, t),~r(s, t) and z (s, t) dcnotc employmcnt, rcal non-human wealth, profits and lump-sum taxation at timc r of an individual born at time s~t, respcctivcly. The individual consumer receives (pays) for every period of his life a premium,~n(s, t), and at thc time of death the individual's net wealth (debt) goes to (is cancelled hy) the life insurance company. The premium is actuarially fair, so that thc lifc insurance (or annuitics) market is efficient. Equation (2.3) ensures that thc individual cannot roll over his debt forever. The consumers maximisc expccted utility, so that the probability of death is added tv the subjcctivc rate of time preference. Total consumption consists of consumption of hume and foreign goods plus the interest forcgone on moncy h~ilclines.
'f he first-order conditions for the individual consumer yie [d cd(s, r) -y,c(s, t), cm(s, t) -y2c(s, t)w(r), m(s, t) -y~c(s, t)~i(t) and the`tilt' of the total consumption function, dc(s, t)(s, t) Idt -(r(t) -a~)c(s, t) . The individual consumcr ensures that the marginal rate of substitution bctween home goods and foreign goods equals the real exchange rate and between home goo~s and real money balances equals the opportunity cost of holding rcal moncy balanccs, i.a, the nominal interest rate. The assumption of Cobb-Uouglas preferences implies that the elasticities of imports with respect to the real exchange rate and of money demand with respect to the nominal intcrest ratc cqual unity. One can writc total consumption as c(s, t) -(cr f~)(n(s, t) f h(s, t)) (2.6) whcrc human wcalth at timc t of an individual born at time s is givcn by
Human wcalth is the discounted stream of after-tax income, where thc discount ratc is augmcntcd with thc probability of dcath in orcJcr tu alluw for thc fact that individuals only carn incomc when they are alive. "I"hr cunsumption funclion is lincar in human plus non-human wcalth, bccausc thc intcrtcmpural clasticity of substitution is assumcd to bc unity. '1'his assumption facilitatcs thc aggregation across individuals born at thc samc instant. (f3lanchard (Ic)t{S) discusscs the implicatiuns o( gcncral iso~clastic utility (unctions for non-monctary economics.)
Agl;rrgutiun ucross indiuiduu(s
'hc aggrcgation proceclurc for familics of finitcly-livccl agcnts duc tu Ya:rri (19fi5) an~[3lanchard (lc)SS) will bc applicJ. At cach instant t:r ncw cohort of sizc~3 is born. Since~3 is also the probability uf clcath, thc sizc at timc t uf the surviving cohort born at time s~t equals~3 exp (-~3(s -t) ) and therefurc the total population at timc t equals f~3 exp (-~3(s -t)) clr -1.
'he population aggregate for, say, total consumption is obtained as the sum of thc total conswnption of all surviving cohorts at time t timcs thc sizc of the surviving cuhort, so that it is defined as (2.9) 
dC(t)~dt -(r(t) -a)C(t) -~3(a f~3)IV(t)
The derivation of (2.10) made use of the fact that, in the absence uf bequcsts, the non-human wcalth of newly born inJividuals must be zeru, rr(t, t) -0. Unlike (2.2), (2.10) docs not contain a life insurance premium as this corresponds to a transfer from those who die to those who survivc ancl thcrcfure this docs not affcct thc rcturn on aggregate nun-human wcalth. Nggregation of human wcalth givcs dll~dt -(r t~3)If -w[. -fl t"L. Suhstitutiun of this and thc aggrcgate consumption function, C-(cr f i)(N t fl), into (2.10) yiclds (2.9).
i. Ficrcurcia! us.rcts curd tlre gouenuiteirt budl;et construint
Thc assct mcnu uf consumcrs consists of rcal humc guvcrnmcnt bon~s, rcal furcign guvcrnmcnt bontls ancl homc cash. Nun-hunr;ut wcalth correspuntls tu N-1l1 f !1, whcrc L3~cnutcs huldings uf humc anJ furcign lll VAN D1~KLUNDGRT AND F. VAN [~ER PLO[G 4f, 5 l;~,vcrnmrnt honcls by homc individuals. "I'hc govcrmncnt scrviccs its dcbt, I,rn~k~,n h"mc :rnd forcit;n guucls, Icvics lumr-sum taxcs ancl linanccs thc rctiullinl; clcliiit hv hrinling moncy or hy horruwing. "l~his is capturcd hy thc~" cnuncnt I,uctt;rt conslr:rint: ln(r)l~tr -r(r)i) (rt -~c(r) -r(r) -uAt(r) .
whcrc !) clcnotcs thc govcrnmcnt dcbt issucd to homc and forcign inilivi~luals, G-(;,~f v(;,,, dcnotcs total cxhaustivc govcrnmcnt spcnding ancl 0 cfcnotcs thc cxogcnous growth ratc of thc ag,grcgatc nominal supplỹ~f outsiclc moncy. tntc~,ralion of (2.11) and thc solvcncy ( no Ponti gamcs) a,nclitii,n~,ivcs
(2.11') ,s o that the current real government debt plus the present discounted value uf futurc governmcnt spending has to be paid off by the present discounted valuc uf futurc lurnp-sum and in(lation taxes. Notc that thc assumption of finitc lives drives a wcdge bctween the discount rate used to calcutate hurnan wealth, r f~3, and the discount rate uscd to calculate government dcht, r. 'l~his wedgc is thc main reason why thc Ricardian dcbt ncutrality proposition does not hold, so that the burden of highcr taxation can be p:rsscd on to futurc gencrations. 
G(r) -c" -~,o(r) f~.(d~(r)~dr),~,,~. -o. (2. ta)
Uhon suhstitution into the governmcnt budget constraint (2.11), onc has
cll)(I)~dr -ti {(r(I)~~i -~i)D(t) t-Go -T.,, -OA1(r)}, (2.15) whcrc~-I I(1 -ti~-~,). To cnsurc thc solvcncy of thc govcrnmcnt's
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financcs, it is assumcd eithcr that~~f~~7 r and~Z -~, -(1 (~-1) or that 41 -~, -0 and~Z t~. J 1(~G 0). The first possibility is discusscd at Icngth in Section 4. The second possibility is discussed in Section 3. Under the second possibility a long-run increase in taxation Icads in the short run to govcrnmcnt surplusses and is therefore precedcd by short-run cuts in taxation and increases in government spcnding. The govcrnment has four policy instruments, viz., C~,, Zi~, t7 and D, of which the first threc can bc chosen indcpcndcntly and the fourth onc follows residually from the govcrnmcnt budget constraint. lt is assumcd that cither rcal or nominal wagcs arc rigid and arc abovc thc market-clcaring Ievel, so that individuals are rationed in thcir supply of labour. This means that their actual supply of labour is given by the demand for labour and should affect their human wealth and cunsumption rather than thc notional supply of labour. Obviously, this spill-ovcr of labour markct discquilibrium into the goods markct implics that consumption will be Icss than if individuals are not rationcd. There is a reasonable amuunt uf empirical evidence that Europe and Japan are characterised by real wagc rigidity, whilst thc US and Canada arc characteriscd by nominal wagc rigidity (e.g., Branson and Rotemberg, l~)S(1; Bruno and Sachs, 19ti5; van dcr ('locg, 1y87). These stylistic facts will be taken account of. Hence, the homc country corresponds to Europc and Japan and has rcal wage rigidity, 
Producrion, labour demand and wage rigidity
I'(r)w(r)I P, (t) -w~~
1~-pvr:ir~-1'vr~Y-Yz~(Yi f Yz). (?. 17)
Upun suhstitution uf (2.1G) and (2.17) into Y(w), onc obtains aggrcgatc suhply uf thc homc country:
lll. VAN DE KLUNDERT AND F. VAN DGR PLOEG
I lrnce, an appreciation of the real exchange rate reduces thc relative price of imports, cuts the wedge between the consumers' and producers' wage, ancl thcrcforc boosts aggregate supply. Thc forcign country corresponds to Ihc US and Canada and has nominal wagc rigidity, (2.19) whcrc forcign variablcs arc dcnotcd by an astcrisk and rc~'(r) -(dW'(r)~dr)~W'(r) dcnotcs thc growth rate of thc forcign rcal w.rgc. Cc~rc inllation in the forcign country is givcn by long-run in(lation, thát is Ihc cxogcnous growth in thc nominal moncy supply ( cf., I3uitcr and 1`tillcr, I')2i2). "f~hc diffcrcncc in thc naturc of thc labour markct discquilihrium is thc main asymmctry in this two-country modcl.
2.5.~nlcntnriona! inrcrdcpendence
1-he world consists of two economies with identical prefcrenees, technologics and dcmographic structures. The forcign country has similar rclationships to the ones discussed in Sections 2.1-2.4 ( except for (2.16) and (2.lti)) and its variables are dcnoted by an asterisk. There is no labour mobility betwcen the two countries and there is no currency substitution. "I'hcrc is perfcct substitution and risk-ncutral arbitrage betwecn home and forcign govcrnment bonds, which results in uncovered interest parity:
whcrc F. dcnotes the nominal exchange rate and E{.} denotes the cxpcctations opcrator. Alternativcly, r(r) -r'(t) f~{(dv(r)~dr)~v(r)}, Wlll'CC V-('ZCrÍ', must hviu. Tircrc; is I~Tipcif~Ct Substitut..~.n bet:`Jeen I:Ome and foreiKn goods and each counlry is wholly specialised in the production of its cxportablc. Thc condition for equilibrium in the home goods market is givcn by Y-CdfGdfCmtCm (2.21) and thc onc for thc foreign goods market is given by
Net holdings of forcign assets are the excess of private sector agents' holdings of bonds over government debt, that is F~B-D. Equilibrium in the world bonds market gives B f vB' -D f vD', which implies F' --F~v. The current account consists of interest payments on net foreign assets plus the balance of trade and equals the increase in wealth of the nation: (C,,,(r) f Gm(r)).
(2.23)
M alternative expression for the balance of trade gives it as the excess of domcstic production ovcr domcstic absorptions, that is Y -Ca -vC," -G.
Notc Ihat (2.23) follows from sublraction of (2.11) and ( 2.12) from (2.10).
a~~x t 1S('nt. hOLICY nNl) PINITL I.IVI.S
Intcgratiun of (2.23) ancl application of thc cuuntry's siilvcncy conJitiun givcs thc cuuntry's intcrtcmporul budgct constraint:
which says that thc currcnt dcbt of thc nation evcntually has to bc paicl off by future savings surpluscs of thc governmcnt and privatc uctor (i.c., by future balancc-of-tracle surpluscs). Therc will bc jumps in thc initial valuc uf thc rcal cxchange ratc, v(0), and thereforc in thc initial Ievcl of forcign asscts. "1'hc mudcl is not complctc until a rule for whcrc bonJs arc hclil initi.~lly is speciliccl. For example, if all goods are denominated in the foreign (homc) country's gooJs thcn F(F') is prcdctcnnincJ. To simplify mattcrs, it will be assumcJ that initially ncithcr country holds any furcign asscts and thcrcfore F(U) -0.
The cumplete mudeL
Thc complctc two-country modcl can be summariscd by tcn cyuations: 
Stcady-statc propcrlics
In thc long run in(lation is entircly dctermincd by monctary growth, so that p-p~-(1 and p' -p~-0'. The rate of depreciation of thc home country's nominal exchange rate equals the differenee between home and forcign monctary growth, (d E~dt)~E -t7 -9', so that in the long run relative purchasing powcr parity holds. In the country with nominal wage rit;iclity unemploymcnt and output are in the long run at thcir natural rates, I-L' -u~and Y' -j(1 -u~) . In the country with real wage rigidity long-run cmployment and output depcnd on the wedge betwecn the rcal producers' and consumers' wage and therefore depend on the long-run real cxchange rate, i.e.
, L-j-~(Y(v)) and Y-Y(v)
, so that aggregate demand can affect long-run activity in the home country. The long-run real exchange rate follows togcthcr with the long-run real interest rate from the equilibrium conditions tor the home and foreign goods markets. Before this can hc discusscd, it is ncccssary to dcrive the expressions for the long-run levcls of total consumption. This will bc donc for thc case~r -~, -0, so that G(~) -G" and 7.(~) -Zu.
Long-run non-human wealth follows from ( 2.10) and (
2.13) and is the annuity value of private dissaving, N--(j(L) -Z~-C)~r, whilst human wcalth is thc discountcd sum of after-tax incomc, lf -(f(L) -Z")~(r f~3), so that total consumption is given by
C-(cr f~)(N f lf) -~(a f~)U(1-) -Zo)~((r f i~)(a f~3 -r)). (3.1)
It is assumcd that a c r(~) c a f~holds. Hcnce, consumption and total wealth are increasing functions of income and the real interest rate and decreasing functions o( taxes. Taxes allect total consumption, because lives arc finite (~i J 0) and thcrcfore the Ricardian debt ncutrality proposition does not hold. An increase in taxation means that the private sector has less Iruman wealth. Also, the government can afford to service a larger govcrnment dcbt and, as with finitc livcs government debt is part of private scctor non-human wcalth, the private sector has more non-human wealth. Iluwcvcr, thc fall in human wealth dominates the increase in non-human wealth and therefore on balance consumption falls. An increase in the prohability of dcath makcs individuals more impatient and increases their Upun substitutiun of (3.1) and ( 2.28) into ( 2.32), one oMains thc humc goods rnarkct cyuilibriurn ( GME) locus,
and a symmetric cxpression for equilibrium in the foreign goods market can bc obtained from ( 2.33). Aggregate supply at home is a dccreasing function of thc real exchangc rate, Y-Y(v), so that the AS schcdule slopcs downwards ( see Fig. 1 ). A depreciation of the real exchange rate boosts foreign demand for home goods and cuts aggregate supply of home goods; thc resulting excess demand for home goods is choked off by the fall in home and foreign demand for home goods induced by the fall in the world real interest rate. Hence, the GME locus slopes downwards in v-r space (see Fig. 1 ).~'he above argument assumes that the indirect effect of an increase in income on aggregate demand is less than the direct effect on aggrcgate supply (i.e., y,~3(a -t~) c (r f ji)(a f J3 -r)). Foreign aggregate supply is fixcd, Y' -f (1 -u~) , so that the upward-sloping GME' locus is stecper than it would have been under rcal wage rigidity. [t follows from Fig. 1 that thc long-run rcal exchange rate and interest rate can be written as:
where thc signs of the partial derivatives are given bclow the expressions and are evaluated on the assumption that there is a domestic bias in demand, that is y, 1 y2 and y' C 2. An increase in foreign government spending (or a decrease in foreign taxation) shifts out the GME' locus by more than the GME locus, so that the home country's real exchange rate depreciates, the wedge between the home producers' and consumers' wage increases, and home output falls (see Fig. 1 ). The incipient exccss demand for home goods, arising from the boost in the home country's net exports and fall in home supply, is cboked off by a fall in consumption which is induced by a fall in the real interest rate and a fall in income. Foreign consumption falls by a smallcr amount. An increase in home govcrnmcnt spending (or a decrcase in home taxation) leads to a fall in the real interest rate, an appreciation of the real exchange rate and a boost of homc ag~rcgatc supply. It is clcar that an incrcasc in govcrnmcnt spcnding (ur a dccrcase in taxation) crowds out private consumption, because it cuts thc wurlJ rcal intcrest ratc. For home privatc consumplion thcrc is an alI(htll)nal cffect, hecause a hOme (fOfelgn) (15C8I l'XpanSlOn also Icads to an Fla. I. f ffccts of an incrcase in foreígn govcrnment spcnding on thc long-run equilihrium.
apprcciation (deprcciation) of thc real exchange ratc and therefore to an increase (fall) in home output, income and consumption. Note tl)at a fiscal cxp:)nsion cuts the real interest rate in thc long run, since hcre it is assumed to he financcd by taxes. When it is financed by bonds, the real interest rate will risc in thc long run (sce Section 4.1). An increase in the home real consumers' wage, cu,,, reduces home output and incomc, which rcduccs the demand for home and foreign goods. Ficnce, both thc GME and the GME" locus shift down. It follows that thc rcal cxchangc ratc apprcciatcs, which attenuatcs thc fall in homc output, whilst thc cffcct on thc rcal interest ratc is ambiguous. An incrcase in thc forcign country's natural uncmploymcnt ratc shifts up both thc (iME and thc GM1:' Ic~cus, sc) th:tt thc rclativc pricc of fc~rcign goods incrcascs and thc 472 FISCAL POLICY ANU FIN[TE LIVGS effcct on the interest rate is ambiguous. Clcarly, the incrcase ín thc home wcdgc mcans that homc output alsu falls. Changcs in monctary growth, :It homc or abroaJ, have no long-run cffccts on thc rcal intcrest ratc, thc rcal cxchangc ratc, output or cmployment. Ilowcvcr, whcn alluwancc is ma~lc for capital accumulation such effccts will occur (Marini and van~cr Plucg, 19tiF{).
Dynamic policy simulation
'Tablc l presents the parameter valucs, values taken on by thc'exogenous variablcs and initial conditions uscd in the numcrical simulations. "I'hc solutiun is ohtaincd with the aid of a multiplc shooting algurithm (Liptun, ct ol., lyR2). Tablc 1 alsu prescnts the cigenvalucs evaluated at the stcady statc. lt is clcar from these that the system satisfies thc saddlepoint property of perfect-foresight systems, since there are (our unstable eigenvalues associatcd with the jump variablcs C, C', M and M' and four stablc ei f;envalues associated with the predetermined variablcs D, D', F and X'. Thcre is onc negative cigenvaluc with a very small magnitutle, -(1.01fi4U4, which corresponds to extremcly sluggish adjustment an~which is mainly associated with the dynamics of the current account. This modc takes about 2íi0 pcriods to settle down to within lolo of its eyuilibrium value (-In (0.lll)~ll.O16404) whilst the others take only about 10 periods.
1. Ti~ht fisca! policy in Europe and loose fiscal policy in the US
To study the effects of fiscal expansion in the US and fiscal contractiun in Europe at the same time, it helps to first look at the impact of both policy 'I'ax rulcs havc hccn uscd to stabilisc the govcrnmcnt ctcht (tit -U.i, , -U.11). nn unanticipatcd, pcrmancnt fiscal cxpansion in Europc incluccs n~i ímpnc-r an execss demand for home goods, whích raises prices and depresses rcal muncy balanccs. "I'he rcal cxchangc ratc apprcciatcs, boosting irnports of forcign goods and depressing exports of home goocls. Private consumption ís crowded out, but the increase in domestic output mitigates this effect. "Che appreciation of the real exchange rate drives a wedge betwecn the producers' and consumers' real wage. The real producers' wage (w) falls Icading to an increase in employment and output. The rise in imports from Although on impact the real interest ratc falls in both Europe anti thc US by U.(Il7rlo and U.038~Io, respectivcly, the nominal interest ratc rises on impact by (1.U26~~, in Europe and by 0.003oIo in the US. "1'hc rcason is that inflation riscs un impact by 0.043~1o in Europe ancl by O.U41r~, in thc US. "I~hc associatcel croweJing out of prívatc consumption un impact occurs thr~~ugh ( alls in hol~ings of rcal moncy balanccs, sincc holclings uf hunils du nut ch.ui(;e i~n iinhact ancl human wcalth increascs un impact.
In thc nu~~liurn run~,ovcrnmcnt dcM in Eïuropc riscs fasl and thc baltlncc of p:rymcnts shows inrrcasin(; clcficits Icading to an accumulatiun of forcit;n drbt. 'I'hc US bcnefils from incrcasing intcrest rcccipts on forcign asscts. "I~hc lung-run sululions rctlect these devclupments. Private conswnption in nc~US has now incrcascd and thc fall in imports from Europc (C,;,) is milig:rtcd. As for Europe, privatc consumption falls cvcn furthcr and imports from the US (C,,,) eventually change sign because of the increascd burdcn of furcign intcrest paymcnts. In thc long~we empluyment in Eurupe rcmains abuvc its initial Icvel as a result of thc wedgc bctwcen ihe pruducers' and consumers' real wage. In the US nominal wage tlcxibility induccs eyuilibrium in thc labour markct ovcr timc.
"1'able 2b presents thc results for an unanticipated fiscal expansion in the US. Oii intpucr prices in the US rise and the real producers' wage falls. Output and empluyment incrcase substantially. There is still somc crowding uut uf privatc consumption but it is relatively smalL 'I'he terms of trade impruve (ur the US. As a result Europe is confronted with a depreciation of its real cxchangc ratc and an incrcasc in its rclative consumcrs' pricc indcx. With rcal wagc rigidity nominal wages increasc and produccrs' prices fall hehincL "I~he increase in rcal wages induces unemployment and a fall in uutput, su that fiscal cxpansion in the US is a bebbur-llry-nei~hbow policy. Privatc cunsumptiun in Gurope declines too, which accentuates the declinc in imports from the US induced by the increase in the relative price of US guuds.
In the mediw~i run the US runs a deficit on the current account of the halancc uf paymcnts and furcign dcbt is accumulatcd. Interest payments now gu from the US to Europe. Meanwhile equilibrium in the US labour market is restored. Output declines and the excess demand for domestic gouds induces further price increases. Crowding out of private consumption continucs over time and is reinforced by the interest payments on foreigñ ebt. Europe becomes worse off as time passes, because its real exchange rate deprcciates further. The unhappy results in the short run are thcrefore magnificd in the long run. The stream of interest payments from the US may wcakcn the proccss, but the trend is not fully reversed as can be sccn from the last two columns uf Table 2b. In the long run unemployment in [:urupc remains at a high IeveL Hence, when Europe has rcal wage rigidity, a favuurable dcrnand shock in the US Icads to an increase in the NAIRU uf F'.urupc, as obscrvcd in Scction 3.
Nute that the rcal exchange rate overshoots its long-run value for a Europcan fiscal cxpansion whilst it undcrshoots for a US fiscal cxpansion. 1n thc absencc uf intcrnational policy coordination US fiscal policy may bc tou luuse if thc US authoritics ignore the adverse effects of fiscal expansion on nc~Eurupcan ecunomy. This conclusion holds for the short and medium run. In the long run the adverse cffects of US fiscal policy are somewhat miti(;atcd by the positive infiuencc on thc European econumy uf forcign intcrest rrccipts. It may bc argucd that (iscal policy in Eurupc is in turn too tight, hccause thc benclicial effects on the US economy are not taken into J76 FISCAL P(~LICY ANf) f~INfIG LIVES accounl. llciwcvcr, such a conclusion dcmands a carcful intcrprctation. In thc short run thcrc is a positivc cffcct on output and cmplriymcnt, hut cimsumptirin ancl wclfarc~cclinc. Thc ncgative tcrms-of-tralic cffcct iliiminatcs thc uulrut cffcct in thc short run. In the Icin~run cyuilihrium in thr I:Ibour markct is restorcJ and the output effcrt vanishes. [3ut then U~c lxisitivc cl(cct of fcircign intcrest rcccipls outwcighs thc nc~atívc trrms-ultraclc cffcct ancl consumption incrcascs. Thc conclusion that Eurc~~~c:tn fitir.ll p~~licy is in thc abscncc of intcrnational policy coorclinatiun tuo ti~ht must thcrcfcirc hc yuali(iccl.
4.2.`Rr~n~~uln~nics': Tax curs prccede curs in goucrmne~u ,rpr~ldirlT
ablc 3a presents the effects of an autonomous reduction in US tax rccci~its (07; --U.4) when thc variablc componcnt of thc tax rulc (~, -I). S,~, -0) is uscd to stabilisc thc govcrnmcnt dcbL Thc i~npac! effccl.c
Tnet.e 3a
('ur in rhe m~r.,nonrous comporteni o~tares in 1he US (~, -0. Table 3a shows that the Icvel of taxcs increases, but that the absolute deviations ( OZ') become smaller as time proceeds. The rise in taxes stabilises the economy but the US runs a deficit on the current account of the balance of payments, which Ieads to an accumulation of foreign debt. The burden of foreign debt weighs heavily on the US economy, because of the interest payments fiowing from the US to Europc. In the long run this has dramatic effects. Unlike the case of tiscal pulicy (Table 2b ) Europe becomes more of a rentier economy in the scnse that it bcnefits from the original tax cut in the US. The signs of the rclcvant variables, i.e., terms of trade, consumption in both countries, and production and employment in Europe, eventually reverse. " Che real exchange rate of the US starts depreciating at t-4 and the terms of trade f:riis bctow the initial stcady-state value at t -18. The depreciation of thc US rral exch;rnóc rate rellects the fact that ultimately the interest payments on foreign (Iebt have to be paid by running a surplus on the trade balance.
Although the system with a tax rule tends towards a new steady state and is therefore stable, the political economy of the US under Mr. Reagan suggcsts that cuts in US taxation gradually lead to incrcascs in US govcrnmcnt dcbt and only thcn to cuts in govcrnmcnt spending (cf., I3lanchard, 1987) . The political economy of fiscal deflation in thc US is such that a rulc for governmcnt spending to ensure the solvency of the governmcnt's Nnances is, perhaps, more realistic than a tax rule. Hence, 'I'able 3b prescnts the effects of a previuusly unanticipated, permancnt cut in US taxcs (0 "L' -07.~; --0.2 at t -0) when thc govcrnmcnt spcnding rulc is givcn hy (Z. I 3) with~, -0. 1 and~a -0.0. As bcforc, thc impuct cJjects on uuthut an~l cmploymcnt arc positive for thc US and ncgativc for Europc. 'I~hcy are much I:rrbcr in magnitude than for the tax cut presentcd in Tablc a, dcspitc thc fact that it correspunds to only half thc rcductiun in taxcs. "I~hc reason is that people anticipate future reductions in government spending instcad of futurc increases in taxes, so that human wealth docs nut fall as much and thcrcforc consumption today will bc highcr than in "Tablc Vnrirrhlr I'1Jtr. i~i-1(i~,i, r i~~L.i r"~i..~C u~í. Pcrccntagc dcviations (exccpt r, r', G' and F for which il is I(KI timcs thc ahx,lute dcviation).
3a. On impact there will be a price increase in the US leading to a fall in real pmducers' wages and an increase in US employment and output. As a result private consumption of domestic and foreign goods rises. The US real exchange rate appreciates, which leads to a fall in exports and an increase in the volume of imports. The depreciation of the European real exchange rate increases the wedge and induces a fall in employment and output. Private consumption falls by even more to create room for a rise in exports from Europe to the US. The price of domestic goods rises in Europe, which is necessary to crowd out private consumers' spending.
The dynamic effec[s show a steady increase in US government debt and a gradual rise in the deficit on the current account. With a low value for~, it takes a long time to stabilise the economy, which is re(lected in the long-run cquilibrium valucs of thc model. For cxamplc, if~, -0.5 instcaJ of 0.1, thc stcady-statc valuc of thc US foreign dcbt is 18.99 instcad of 204.48 and as a result the requirrd long-run depreciativn of the US real exchange rate, in lll. VAN Pcrccntage dcviations ( exccpl r, r', G' and F ror which it is IUU limcs the absulute dcviation).
or(Ier to generate the long-run trade surplus necessary to finance the servicing of the foreign debt, is only 12.57 rather than 29.32 (see Table 3c ). Ilowcvcr, the medium-term results mcrit somc closcr attention. The re(luction in govcrnmcnt spending at !-1 is substantial, because its de(lationary impact Icads to a reversal of signs with respect to employment antl output. Whereas output and employment decrease, crowding-in allows a rise in consumers' cxpcnditure. This is [he typical pattern for the US cronomy. '1'hc govcrnmcnt has to cut expcnditure along thc a~justmcnt h:tth. "1'his Icacls tu a rcccssion with output and employmcnt dcclining for a prutractcJ pcriod of timc (the lowest point is attained at t-9). I lowever, privatc cunsumption (lourishcs when thc govcrnmcnt stcps back gradually. I"he US r~~al cxchangc rate tlepreciates as the (lcllatiunary effccls of a rctiuction ín govcrnmcnt spcnding dominatc thc sccnc. "This has a favourahlc irnp:tct on the Eurupcan cconomy. Uncmploymcnt in Europc clcclincs anJ frum 1-3 onw;trds thcrc is a situatiun of ovcrcmploymcnt. Output an~ JRII fISCAL POLICY AND PINII'E LIVGS cmploymcnl risc along the adjuslmcnt path. Thc dcprcciatic~n uf Ihc US rcal exchangc ratc is rcinforccd in thc coursc of timc as intcrest paymcnts tci Eurohc risc tul;cthcr with thc incrcasc in forcign dcbt.
In thc lun~~run thcrc is cyuilibrium on Ihc US halancc of paymcnts, lrut thc US cmcrt;cs as a strong dchtor cotmtry. Thc cxports fnmi Ihr US tu Europc show a dramatic, risc, whilc US imports cvcn dcclinc. It tihuuld hc nirtcd that thcsc cffccts arc mitigatcd i[~, is highcr. I~or intitancc, wilh , -(1.5 thc rcccssion following a cut in taxcs is dcchcr and shortcr. "1'hc lowcst puint in cmploymcnt is now attaincd at r-3. As a result stahilisation of thc US cconomy rcyuires ultimatcly a rcduction in govcrnmcnt cxpcncliturc which is Icss than half thc valuc of thc cut in govcrnmcnt cxpcnditurc whcn~, -0. 1. 'Thc dccpcr rccession also has a rclativcly favourahlc cffcct on thc h:rlancc of paymcnts. In thc ncw stcady statc thc incrcasc in thc forcign dclicit amounts to 18.9 (scc Tablc 3c) which has to hc comparcd with thc risc of 2(14.5 in Table 3b . It folluws that`Rcagan~mirs' sh~iuld hc strong tu avoid advcrsc long-run effccts on Ihc balancc of paymcnts. A puwcrful rcccssion is nccdcd to control the crowding-in uf privalc consumption.
Uirplcns~riu monerarisr arillunclic
A policy of tight money wilhout a tax rule or an cxpcnditure rule (~, -~, -0. (1) to guarantce the solvency of the governmcnt's financcs will Icad to an cxcessive growth of govcrnment debt. At a ccrtain point in time agents may rcfuse to absorb additional government bonds. To finance ihc deficit after this cciling has been attained the monctary authoritics will havc to opt for an increase in monetary growth, that is a policy of`easy' money.
'he alternative of increasing taxes is not considered, because the issue here is to what cxtent thc monctary authority can fight in(lation if it is not in a position to make a struclural fiscal adjustment. In olher words, macroeconomic coordination implies that fiscal authorities`move' first. Sargent and Wallacc (1981) have shown that such a policy of tight moncy now and loosc moncy latcr may result in a higher rate of inttation now, becausc agents anticipate what is going to happen in the future. In this section the cffccts iif a holicy switch from tight moncy now towards loosc moncy latcr in thc US arc disrusscd. For conveniencc, it is assumcd that in L-uropc Ihc f;ovcrnment hudgct is balanccd all the time by adjusting taxcs.
To improvc our undcrstanding of the policy switch a comparison will bc madc with :r p~licy of tight moncy in thc US undcr a tax rulc (ti, -O.S, l. -II) upcrating in both counlrics to stabilisc the economy. In this cxamplc macrocamomic pulicy coordination implics that munctary authuritics 'movc' first. l~hc cffccts of this bcnchmark vicw are prescntcd in Tablc 4a. It is assumcil that thc US monctary growth ratc is rcduccd hy U.S pcrccntagc points. A miinctary disinflation Icads on impact to a fall in the pricc i~f drnncslir~.ixids in thc US. Sincc thcre is numinal wagc rigidity in thc US, I'rrccnl;rgc dcviatiuns (cxccpt r, r', P, P', U' and F for which il is lU0 umcs Ihc absolutc dcviation).
thc rcal producers' wage rises and output and employment decline. Consumption of dumcstic goods and imports fall too, but the balancc is shi(tcd towards forcign goods as the real exchangc rate appreciates. Thc reirresponding dcprcciation of the European real exchanbe rate increases thc wcdge betwecn the producers' and the consumcrs' wage, which results in wicmployrncnt and a fall in output. As a conseyucncc consumption in Europc falls as wcll. Inflatiun initially ovcrshoots by 1.31`!o and subseyucntly thcrc is a gradual adaptíon of thc inflation ratc towards Ihc monctary browth ratc in thc US. As a result the ncgative volume cffects are to a large cxtcnt revcrsed. "The incrcatir in taxcs stabiliscs govcrnmcnt dcbt in both countrics. In thc long run thcrc arc minur changcs in consumption as a result of opposing changcs in thr cumpuncnts u( rcal wcalth. In thc US non-human wcalth incrcascs, hut human wc;llth dccrcascs by a largcr amount. ln Eurupc the situation is the other way around, because foreign assets are accumulated in line with thc deprcciation of thc rcal exchange rate.
Notc that with a monctary disinflation the real exchange rate misadjusts rathcr than overshoofs as in the famous Dornbusch (1976) modcl. The rcason is that a monetary disinflation in the US means that the US bccomcs a dcbtor nation and requires a long-run trade surplus to finance the interest paymcnts to Europc, which in turn rcquires a long-run dcprcciation of thc US rcal cxchange rate. It follows that a US monetary disin(lation is a bcggar-thy-ncibhbour policy in thc short run, but a locomotivc pcilicy in thc lung run.
l~hc cf(ccts of tight moncy now and loosc moncy latcr in thc US arc prescntc(1 in Tahlc 4b. lt is assumcd that thcre is a cciling on thc amount uf govcrnmcnl dcht, which is atlaincd at !-11. Thc rnaximum incrcasc of (Icbt amounts to abuut Iiirln. I31;f0(e thc cciling is hit (f -ll, I,..., 111) monctary growth is rc(luccd by 0.5 pcrccntaFc points. At f-11 Ihc ccilinF (in US lll. VAN I)G KLUNDERT AND F. VAN DER PLO[C'.
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gcwcrnmcnt Jcbt is hit, D' -16.Od6, and from thcn onwards thc growth r:rte of nwn~y is determined en~ogenously in such a way that the guvernnunt huJget is balanced. To rcalise a balanccd budget thc monetary growth ratc has tu bc incrcased ( sce Tablc 4b). Ultimatcly 0' and p' risc by murc th:rn unc hcrccntagc point, so that tight moncy in thc intcrim pcriod imhlics a pcrmancntly highcr ratc of inflation. Thc rcason (or this is that thc US govcrnmcnt nuw has to scrvicc a largcr dcbt ( cf., van Wijnbcrgcn, I'1t;S).
On impact uf thc monctary disinflation thcre is a rclativcly small rcduction in thc pricc of domcstic goods in thc US, comparcd with thc uutcumc in 'I'ahlc Qa. Kcal wagcs risc somcwhat and output, consumption and cmploymcnt dcclinc. f Iowcver, thc development is alrcady revcrsed in ticriud t-1.~~hc rcduction in nominal wagcs causcd by an exccss supply of labuur cxcccds thc fall in priccs, so that cmployment and thc othcr rcal variables incrcase. The decline in the rate of inflation is moderate and stays bchind the reduction in the growth rate of the money stock. Inflation rises in thc course of time and at t-4, long bcfore the cciling is hit, the rate of inflation is cvcn highcr than in the initial steady state. This result confirms the finding of Sargcnt and Wallace that tight money now may go hand in hand with a higher rate of inflation now if agents fully anticipate the corrective mcasures to be taken later when the private sector refuses to absorb an incrcasing amount of government bonds. The results for Europc as an cconomy run parallel with those in the US. The European real exchange rate first depreciates and then appreciates, which Ieads to a reversal in thc signs of all real variables.
In thc lung run there are no eflects on real variables. Inflation increases in thc uS but does not change in Europe. Non-human wealth in the US is conslant, because the increase in real government debt is exactly matched by a declinc in real cash balances. Money is neutral in the long run. Long-run changcs, as obscrved in Table 4a , come from a change in the tax Icvcl, which influences human as well as non-human wealth in a modcl with tinitc lives as sliown in Section 3. As discussed above, taxes arc hcld cunstant in the Sargent-Wallace exercise discussed above.
Supply-.cidc pulicics
Supply-side policics in Europe can be interpreted as measures to reduce rcal wagcs. 'I'ahle Sa prescnts thc results of ineasures taken to reduce the initial stcady-statc rcal consumcrs' wage (cu") by fivc pcrccnt. A wagc rcduction Icacls tu an incrcasc in cmployment and output. As a result thc f:urupc:rn tcrms uf trade declines and part of the initial fall in real wages is rcvcrsecl :rs wurkcrs have to be compensated fur higher import prices.
I lcnce, thc rral pruducers' wage falls by only 2.75~Io. The increase in uutput induces a risc in consumption of domestic goods, whereas the unfavourable dcvclupment in thc tcrms of tradc Icads to a dcclinc in imports. Pcrecnlagc dcviations (cxcept r, r' and F for which il is IIKI timcs thc absolutc Jcviation). on thc US cconomy is small exccpt for US imports from Europc which incre:r~c substantially as European goods become relativcly cheaper.
The dynamic eJjecrs are moderate and the long-run solution diffcrs only slightly from thc short-run result. Europe accumulates forcign asscts in small arnounts. Ultimately, the US has to pay interest on its foreign debt which is reflected in a somewhat lower level of imports in the long run.~'he othcr sidc of thc coin is that consumption in Europe gains from thc accruing intcrest payments. in the long run imports from thc US even increase.
Supply-side policies in the US are directed at reductions in the natUral ratc of unemployment. The effects of a reduction in u~by (ive pcrcentagc points are prescntcd in Table Sb . It is assumed that the rcduction is hrought ahuut in thc initial period, which makes the interpretatiun of thc rrsults sumcwhat catiicr. n fall in thc NAIRU Icads to a dcclinc in nominal wal;cs after a laf;. O!r inylacr of thc supply shock changcs are small cxcept fur thc rcal ratc cif ínlcrest which hati to incrcasc in buth countrics tu chukc crff ronsumpti(m in anticipation of bcttcr titncs. Ovcr thc adjustmcnt pcriud Pcrcenlage Jevia(ions (except r, r' and F for which it is 100 times (he abtiulutc dcviation).
numinal an(1 rcal wagcs in the US decline whilst employment and output gra(lually incrcase. Nominal prices decrease to absorb the additional output ancl the terms of trade deteriorates. For Europe this means an improvement in Ihe terms of trade leading to a decrcase in the cust of living. Hence, numinal antl rcal wabcs dcclinc which results in a risc of employmcnt and uutput.
Thc situ.rtiun applics to the medh~m run, from t-1 to t-10. Labour markct atljustment in the US Icads to higher employment and output which sl~ills ovcr tu Eurupc. Around t-10 thc adjustmcnt in the labour markct is ncarly completed. Employment increases by S.SoIo, which is consistent with a(all in thc natural rate of unemployment from l0oro to Solo. The long-rwi results arc pr.rctically indistinguishablc from thc outcomcs at t-10. 1ccumulatiun uf furcibn assets by the US economy occurs at a luw rate anJ thc assuciatctl intrrest payrncnts arc thcrcfore ncgligiblc.
It fnlluws th;lt supply-si(le policies in Europe incrcase wclfare in the US. "I~hc US Icrms uf tra(Ic improvc, which raiscs imports without affccting thc cunsumptiun of dumrstic goods very much. Fur the US there are almust nu JFt6 FISCAL F'OLICY AND FINII'E LIVES output and employment effects. However, supply-side policics in the US incrcasc cmrloymcnt and output in bolh thc US and fiurorc. " l~hc tcrms of traclc m~ivcs against thc US and thc wcdgc hctwccn thc hroduccrs' an~l consurncrs' rcal wa f;c in Europc dcclincs.
Concluding rcmarks
A twu-country, pcrfcct-foresight moclcl with mirro founclations, (initc livcs, intcrtcmporal budgct constraints for thc two govcrnmcnts and privatc scctor agcnts, current-account dynamics, uncovcrcd intcrest parity, (loating cxchangc ratcs, impcrfect substitution bctwccn homc and forcign f;ouds, intcrnational labour immobility, rcal wagc rigidity at homc (Europc) and nominal wage rigidity abroad (US) has been formulatcd and its stcady-statc and tr:rnsicnt propcrtics have bccn analyscd. In ordcr to rclax thc Ricardian dcht ncutrality proposition and to give a non-trivial rolc for fiscal policy, it has bccn assumcd that thcrc is no intergcncrational bcqucst motivc and livcs are finite so that the burden of highcr taxation can be passcd on to future generations. This also allows a richer form of current-account dynamics. Unemployment has bccn the main problcm of thc OECD cconornics in the eighties, so it has been assumcd that wagcs are inlicxiblc. In vicw of recent empirical evidence, it has been assumed that there is a nominal wage rigidity in the US and real wage rigidity in Europc and Japan. This framework allows one lo reconsider the policy conclusions derived from ad-hoc Mundell-Fleming models (Branson and Rotemberg, 1980; Argy and Salop, 1983; Bruno and Sachs, 1985; van dcr Plocg, 1987) in an internally consistent fashion. In particular, it allows one to consider the intertemporal aspects of the view that a European fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy whilst a US fiscal expansion is, typically, a beggar-thyneighbour policy.
A European fiscal expansion, when tax rules are used to stabilise the government debt, Ieads on impact to a jump appreciation of the real exchange rate which overshoots its equilibrium value, a fall in real interest ratcs, a fall in European consumption of home goods, an increase in European imports, a fall in European exports, an increase in European and US output and employment, and a fall in US consumption. Hence, as far as output is concerned, a European fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy in thc short run. Over time the Europcan governmcnt debt builds up and thc tradc dcficits Icad to Europc bccoming a debtor nation. To financc its dcbt service, Europe rcquires a trade surplus in the long run and therefore its real exchange rate depreciates over time. It follows that in the long run Europcan consumption falls even more whilst US consumption increases. A US fiscal expansion leads on impact to undershooting of its real exchange rate, an increase in US output and employment, a(all in US consumption, and a fall in European output, employment and consumption. Ilence, a US fiscal expansion is a beggar-thy-ncighbour policy in the short run. Over time the US real exchange rate continucs to appreciate, which further raises the III. VAN DG KLUNDGRT AND F. VAN DGR 1'LOBG 4H7 Eurupcan wcclge between the consumers' and producers' wages and thus further clcpresscs Europcan output and cmpluyment. '1"he US emerges as a cJchtor naliun.
An autunumous rcduction in US tax reccipts Ieads to misadjustment of the terms of traelc, consumption in both countries and Europcan employment; on impact (in the lung run) the US real exchange rate appreciates (clcprcciatcs), Europcan cunsumption, output and employmcnt fall (incrcasc), anel US consumption increases (falls). Eience, a cut in US taxes is a hcggar-thy-neighhuur policy in the short run but a locomotive policy in the long run. "I"hc political cconomy of thc US undcr Mr. Rcagan suggests that cuts in US taxation gradually Icad to increases in US govcrnment dcbt and only thcn tu cuts in government spending, hence a rule for guvcrnmcnt spcnding tu ensure the sotvency of the government's finances may be morc rcalistic. I3ecause people anticipate future cuts in government spending rather than incrcases in taxes, human wealth does not fall as much and conseyuently the impact effects on US output and employment are much larger. As the government cuts back, private consumption tlourishes. When 'Rcaganomics' is strong, that is, when govcrnment spending reacts strongly to govcrnmcnt debt, there is a much deeper (temporary) recession and as a result the US debt is much less high and the US real exchange rate needs to dcprcciatc much less.
"1-hc Sargent-Wallace (1981) arguments about unpleasant monetarist arithmetic can also be considered. When there is no tax rule or government spcnding rule to stabilise the govcrnment debt and when there is a limit to the amount of government bonds the private sector is prepared to purchase, an exccss of government spending over taxes plus seigniorage revenues must eventually be financed by either an increase in monetary growth or a structural fiscal adjustment. In the former case, tight money today implies high in(lation tomorrow, and, under pcrfcct (oresight, high inflatiun today. Also, in the process the government debt has increased and therefore one en~s up with a permancntly higher inflation rate in order to generate thc seigniurage revenucs to meet the interest payments on thc additional government tlebt (van Wijnbergen, 1985) . ln the latter case, one ends up with eithcr a permanently lower Ievel of government spending or a pcrmancntly highcr Icvcl of taxation.
A US monetary disinflation leads on impact to an appreciation of the US rcal cxchangc rate, which misadjusts rathcr than ovcrshoots its cyuilibrium valuc. As far as Europcan consumption, output and employment is concerned, a US disintlation is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy in the short run and a lucomotive policy in the long run. The reason is that over time thc US bccomcs a clchtur nation and reyuires a long-run dcprcciation uf thc US rral cxchangc rate, which reduccs the wcelge bctwcen thc Europcan pruclucrrs' and consumcrs' wagc ancl cunscyucntly boosts Europcan uutput ancl cmpluynunt in lhc long run.
I`hrrc arc :rt Iratit two impurtant clirectiuns of futurc researrh. "fhc first is
